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of the court may be partial, one-sided, and give an advantage to the
sustaining party. To say jurors must be insured freedom of action, and
at the same time open the door for one side and not for the other, seems
too high a price to pay for the assurance to jurors of serenity of mind.
VINCENT A. VASSALLO
Torts - Remedy of Personal Representative for the Wrongful Death
of an Unborn Child -Beatrice
Verkennes, mother of the deceased
child and wife of the plaintiff, engaged defendant physician to take
care of her during pregnancy and the delivery of her child. While at
the hospital defendant allegedly was negligent in properly aiding, treating, and caring for her during her confinement, and that by reason
thereof the foetus died undelivered. Held: under a wrongful death
statute, the personal representative of an unborn child alleged to be
viable and capable of separate and independent existence, whose death
was caused by the negligence of the physician in charge of the mother,
may maintain an action therefor on behalf of the next of kin of such
deceased child. Verkennes v.Cornieaet aL., 38 N.W. (2d) 838, (Minn.,
1949).
There is a conflict of authority on the issue whether the special administrator for the unborn child has a cause of action on behalf of the
unborn child. The majority of jurisdictions follow the early case of
Dietrich v. Inhabitantsof Northampton.' Justice Holmes there maintained that a child en ventre sa mere has no juridical existence, and is
so intimately united with its mother as to be a "part" of her and as a consequence is not to be regarded as a separate, distinct, and individual entity. The reasoning thus expressed follows the common law.2 In an
Illinois case plaintiff's mother, ten days before being confined, negligently was injured in defendant's elevator. Plaintiff, who was born
four days later, was also negligently injured. The State has an unlawful death statute, but in denying recovery to the child the opinion read:
"That a child before its birth is in fact, a part of the mother, and
is only severed from her at birth, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed. The doctrine of the civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, therefore, that an unborn child may be
regarded as in esse for some purposes, when for its benefit, is a
mere legal fiction, which, so far as we have been able to discover,
has not been indulged in by courts of common law to the extent
of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned before
its birth. If the action can be maintained, it necessarily follows
that an infant may maintain an action against its own mother for
injuries occasioned by the negligence of the mother while preg'3
nant with it. We are of the opinion that the action will not lie."
1138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
252 Am. Jur. 440, sec. 98.
3 Allaire v. St Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
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RECENT DECISIONS

There are other leading cases that follow the common law doctrine,
and maintain the wrongful death statute in no way changes it. 4
Some cases deny recovery to the representative of the unborn child
because there was no contract relation between the defendant and the
unborn infant. They say that even though there is a contract relation
between the defendant and the mother, injury to the unborn infant is
too much of a coincident, and to respond with damages to it is beyond
the limits of defendant's duty. 5
Some authorities have taken the view of the Minnesota case but
they are definitely in the minority. They say the taking of the life of
an unborn child is considered a wrong against society. Consequently
there is no logical reason for denying the right of civil compensation to
one injured by the commission of a wrong while viable in the womb.0
There are also cases which permit a child recovery after birth for injuries received while viable, under a wrongful death statute or by construction of the state constitution.8
In a Wisconsin case 9 the plaintiff sustained injuries because of the
negligence of the defendant. At the time of the injury the foetus was
about five months of age, before it could have been viable. Plaintiff
later was born and alleged she suffered from epileptic fits as a result of
the parental injury. The Court said no cause of action accrued to an
unborn child before it could be born viable. However, the dicta in the
case said that a contrary rule might be urged if the infant was viable
and defendant, being a doctor or midwife, had negligently injured an
unborn child.
It seems that generally the courts have not permitted the next of
kin of the viable infant recovery, or where the infant child lives, recovery by it. Recovery is not allowed because the defendant owes no
duty of conduct to a person not yet in existence, or because of the difficulty of proving the causal connection between the negligence to the
mother and then to the child. However, with modern day therapy and
with more recent cases allowing recovery, it now seems courts may permit recovery upon proper proof. 0
JoHN D. STEiN
4 Magnolia Coca Coal Bottling Co., v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. (2d) 944,
97 A.L.R. 1513 (1935) ; Buel v. United Railways Co., 240 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71
(1913).
5 Buel v. United Railways Co., 240 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Nugent v.
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y. Supp. 367 (1913).
6 Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741 (1928);
Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 464 (1933); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa.
D. & C. 227 (9124); Bonbrest et al. v. Kotz et al., 65 F. Supp. 138 (1946);
Montreal Tramway v. LeVeille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
7 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1938).
s Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E. (2d) 334, (Ohio, 1949).
9 Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. and Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916
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1*PROSSER ON TORTS, § 118.

